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Reacting to Anticipations: Energy Crises and Energy 
Policy in the 1970s. An Introduction 
Frank Bösch & Rüdiger Graf ∗ 
Abstract: »Reaktionen auf Antizipationen. Energiekrisen und Energiepolitik in 
den 1970er Jahren. Eine Einführung«. Changes in the energy sector cannot be 
sufficiently described as reactions to past and present energy problems. Rather, 
politicians and companies alike always react to the anticipation of future chal-
lenges. Sharing this assumption, the articles in this HSR Special Issue re-
examine the energy crises of the 1970s. Their assessments broaden the tem-
poral and spatial scope of analysis and integrate various energy resources into 
the picture, while examining how to situate the first and second oil crises with-
in the 1970s and the contemporary history of the industrialized world as a 
whole. 
Keywords: Energy crisis, oil crisis, 1970s, Cold War, Europe, USA, contemporary 
history. 
1.  Introduction 
For a long time, the history of the second half of the twentieth century has 
been, above all, the history of the Cold War. The conflict between the global 
superpowers seems to have determined the epoch’s basic political, economic, 
and societal features. However, with the Cold War’s increasing historical dis-
tance and the simultaneous rise of social, economic, and cultural historiography 
– as opposed to the classical political – alternative suggestions for interpreta-
tion and periodization have emerged.1 Many historians now construct the 1970s 
as a crucial transformative phase in the history of Western industrialized coun-
tries and, perhaps, even the world as a whole.2 Understanding contemporary 
history not as the consequence of the past but as the antecedent of the present, 
as Hans Günther Hockerts put it, the 1970s indeed are a good place to start.3 
The most salient problems that Western industrialized nations face today – e.g., 
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economic depression and mounting welfare state expenses, international terror-
ism, energy and the environment – seem to have emerged in this decade. 
Moreover, the 1970s are in an advantageous position for historical scrutiny. 
Archives have been recently opened, and most of the currently leading histori-
ans were in their youth or young adulthood during this decade, while their PhD 
students were not yet born or too young to consciously perceive the events.  
In many historiographical narratives of the 1970s, as well as in broader pub-
lic discourse, the first oil crisis in 1973 seems to be a turning point when cen-
tral aspects of the current political predicament emerged. It is either described 
as important for the momentous transformations that marked the decade or 
used as shorthand to refer to the changes.4 In particular, certain pictures that the 
oil crisis produced became iconic for the remembrance and historiography of 
the 1970s. Yet, these pictures vary between countries. In the United States, the 
oil crisis and, to a certain extent, the decade are commonly illustrated with 
either cars queuing in front of filling stations or signs saying “sorry, no gas.” 
This visualization suggests that the oil crisis was a failure of the market or of 
politicians and the subsequent suffering of consumers. In contrast, the pictures 
from Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands that depict empty highways 
during Sunday driving bans symbolically allude to state efforts to encourage 
energy savings. 
What we commonly describe as the first “oil crisis” consisted of two inter-
connected processes: the oil price rises implemented by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which quadrupled the price of oil 
within a few months, and the coinciding oil embargo and production cuts orga-
nized by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 
order to force Western nations and Japan to assume a more pro-Arab stance in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict that had turned violent with the Yom Kippur War in 
October 1973.5 The standard account commonly describes this oil crisis as a 
sudden shock to the industrialized countries. It maintains that politicians and 
the public only then realized the West’s resource and political dependence on 
the availability of cheap oil that, in the future, would come mainly from the 
Gulf region.6 Lumped together as the “oil crisis” in broader histories of the 
1970s, these events have been linked to the rising importance of energy as a 
field of national and international politics, the shifting of global conflict lines, 
and the economic downturn and depression. The shorter the narrative, it seems, 
the more importance it attaches to the oil crisis, sometimes describing it as an 
essential cause of the more general transformations of the 1970s. The oil crisis 
is used as a metonymy to refer to the change from the postwar economic boom 
to the economic crisis, from an age of seemingly limitless possibilities to the 
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realization of limits, from euphoric hopes for a better future to expectations of 
decline or doom, and from the idea of rational planning of economic and social 
developments to pragmatic attitudes of crisis management.  
In 1979, another oil crisis led to a global challenge. Suddenly, oil from Iran 
– which had previously supplied 10 percent of the world’s oil, making it the 
world’s second largest exporter – almost completely dropped out of the market. 
In a short period of time, oil prices doubled, reaching a new all-time high. 
Many academic books stress the importance of the second oil crisis, describing 
it as a catalyst for another dramatic economic crisis and inflation. Despite its 
significance, the second oil crisis has remained less salient in the collective 
memory, at least in Europe, because it seemed like a recurrence of 1973. How-
ever, US President Jimmy Carter’s famous “Crisis of confidence” speech made 
1979 a symbol for the “great malaise” of the late 1970s in the United States.7  
Historians have neither invented any of the abovementioned nor the many 
other available assessments of how to situate the oil crises within 1970s. Con-
temporary Western politicians and the media have already used similar terms 
and interpretations in 1973/74 or 1979/80, while communist propaganda tri-
umphed that the crises revealed the decline of capitalism and the coming victo-
ry of communism. It immediately became common among contemporaries to 
describe the events as “crises” in an analytical sense: as situations in which the 
pace of historical change seemingly accelerated and two existentially different 
futures were equally possible; that is, as situations that demanded immediate 
and fundamental decisions and actions.8 In the aftermath of the first oil crisis, 
academics and the public already perceived it as an event that would funda-
mentally influence the development of the industrialized world. For example, at 
the end of two major conferences on the consequences of the oil crisis orga-
nized by the Harvard Center for International Affairs, economist Raymond 
Vernon admitted that political observers generally tend to exaggerate the signifi-
cance of the events they experienced. They often turn marginal transformations 
into major crises, he continued, but “the events in the oil market that drew the 
world’s attention in the months following October 1973 […] may prove to have a 
more enduring significance.”9 During and immediately after the oil crisis, many 
similar judgments were made as the event was scrutinized from various angles. 
Economists examined its economic causes and impacts, and political scientists 
analyzed the surrounding political conflicts, rendering the crisis a paradigm 
case for the analysis of international relations.10 Middle Eastern studies blos-
somed, and the booming interdisciplinary field of energy and resource studies 
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used the oil crisis to justify their examinations of energy production and con-
sumption and their suggestions on how to improve in the energy sector.11  
Many of these analyses, not to mention the various government agencies 
and commissions or the International Energy Agency, contained excellent 
assessments of the economic, political, social, and sometimes even cultural 
aspects of the oil crises. As historians, we can turn to them to understand how 
oil and energy flows were affected, what happened with the petrodollars, and 
which policies were implemented. Although contemporary experts have agreed 
on some issues, their opinions concerning the causes, developments, and ef-
fects of the oil crises differ widely. Their heterogeneous disciplinary back-
grounds and political preferences have caused the disagreement, which is most 
evident in their responses to the following question: Did the oil crises indicate 
or foreshadow the coming of oil or even energy scarcity, which would necessi-
tate conservation in the present, or were the crises due to poor and selfish poli-
cy decisions that could have been easily overcome if markets were allowed to 
operate freely?12 These differing perspectives still persist today in the debates 
on “peak oil” and the promise of an allegedly coming energy abundance from 
new fracking techniques. Thus, in looking back at the 1970s, there is a tenden-
cy to share the stance of contemporary observers and reiterate past conflicts in 
present guises, sometimes using newly available sources.13  
This HSR Special Issue tries to avoid this trap, while, at the same time, 
drawing an important lesson from the continuing debates about energy scarcity 
and abundance – that is, energy policy making is usually in reaction to the 
anticipation of future situations. Whereas past experiences and perceptions of 
current problems do have an influence, the anticipation of future supply con-
stellations is crucial for policy formation and determines what exactly is per-
ceived as a problem in the present. While this anticipatory structure may hold 
for many policy fields, it is especially salient in energy policy. Changes in the 
energy sector have particularly long lead times, since the exploration of re-
sources and the construction of pipelines, refineries, and power plants take 
years and are extremely costly.  
With a focus on reactions to the anticipation of future energy situations, the 
articles in this volume challenge the importance of the first oil crisis as a global 
turning point.14 They do so by extending the perspective on the 1970s energy 
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crises in three dimensions. First of all, most of the articles situate the first oil 
crisis within a longer time frame, often starting in the 1960s, and then examine 
the second oil crisis at the end of 1979. Most authors thus reject the dominating 
perception within historical and public discourse, as they argue that the first oil 
crisis was neither the sudden and unexpected nor the all-decisive turning point. 
Secondly, most of the papers focus not on oil alone, but integrate other sources 
of energy into the picture: coal, nuclear, and gas. This widened perspective 
does not mean to downplay the essential role of oil in the energy balances of 
(Western) industrialized countries at the time, but acknowledges that contem-
poraries also saw other forms of energy as solutions to the crises and that “en-
ergy” emerged as a coherent field of knowledge and policy in the 1970s. Final-
ly, in contrast to many allegedly global histories of oil, which deal with only 
Western industrialized countries (especially the United States and Britain) and 
parts of the Middle East, this volume bridges the East-West divide. Some pa-
pers examine the consequences of the energy crises for not only Eastern Europe 
but also the history of the Cold War, thereby, shedding new light on this major 
paradigm of postwar historiography. Since it has been common sense for both 
contemporaries and historians to describe oil as a globally traded good, the 
volume questions how “global” the transnational flow of oil and, thus, the oil 
crises truly were.  
2.  Temporal Scope and Periodization  
In contemporary history, the 1960s are commonly perceived as a decade of 
economic boom and high hopes for a future of prosperity and abundance in 
Western Europe and the United States. Moreover, the 1960s and early 1970s 
were characterized by a belief in rational socio-economic planning, which 
allegedly lost its appeal as financial problems grew after 1973. While many 
contemporaries of the 1960s indeed expressed visions of a coming era of abun-
dance, others saw warning signs that the energetic foundation of these visions 
might not be as stable and secure as commonly assumed. As Elisabetta Bini 
and Henning Türk argue, the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the failed embargo of 
1967 in the wake of the Six-Day War were perceived as warning signs that 
political upheavals might interrupt the flow of oil. Yet, the embargo also left 
the OECD countries with a seeming reassurance that precautionary measures 
and the United States’ spare production capacity would make it easy to deal 
                                                                                                                                
at Ruhr University Bochum and with financial support by the Thyssen Foundation. Jenny 
Seifert corrected the papers written by the non-native speakers linguistically. 
HSR 39 (2014) 4  │  12 
with supply crises.15 In this constellation, it was not so much the rising claims 
of the producing countries to acquire “permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources” that were worrisome, but rather the energy problems in the United 
States which led to a loss of domestic spare production capacity and, thus, their 
ability to help their European allies in times of crisis. As Robert D. Lifset argues, 
the energy crisis in the United States stemmed from a combination of problems in 
the oil, natural gas, and utility sectors, all of which occurred independently of the 
actions of OPEC and OAPEC in the fall of 1973. Thus, the restructuring of US 
energy policy started before the actual oil crisis, and the same is true for Western 
Europe, where energy experts learned of the United States’ mounting energy 
problems and the impending loss of its spare production capacity at a meeting of 
the OECD’s High Level Group Oil in January 1970.16 
Companies also started to anticipate problems in the oil sector. As Jonathan 
Kuiken shows, in the late 1960s, BP and Shell already started to warn the Brit-
ish government of increasing demands within the producing countries to con-
trol production and price. Their admonitions, together with the government’s 
positive expectations of the North Sea Oil, led the United Kingdom to overhaul 
its energy policy before the oil crisis. Also anticipating difficulties in the oil 
and energy supply in the late 1960s, the German chemical companies BASF 
and Hoechst developed plans to construct their own nuclear power stations in 
order to secure their energy needs independently. Moreover, before the oil 
crisis, East-West energy trade intensified, as Frank Bösch, Jeronim Pérovic, 
and Dunja Krempin show. On the one hand, they acknowledge that East-West 
trade was part of a conscious Western strategy to overcome the dividing lines 
of the Cold War by fostering commerce and communication.17 On the other 
hand, they also show that the trade came out of economic necessity in the East 
and a Western strategy to diversify energy imports in order to reduce depend-
ence on the Middle East. The brief embargo after the Six-Day War in 1967 
already served as a major argument for West German politicians to cooperate 
with the Soviet Union, as Frank Bösch shows. 
These early anticipations of a coming energy crisis did not mean that the 
countries were well prepared for the events unfolding in October of 1973. Even 
taking into account that changes in the energy sectors could not be introduced 
in a short timeframe, the transformations in Western Europe and the United 
States turned out to be tedious and were hampered by differing interests and 
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expectations for the future.18 Mogens Rüdiger argues that there was hardly any 
preparation in Denmark, and Henning Türk shows why the OECD crisis mech-
anism was ill-suited for countering the measures implemented by OPEC and 
OAPEC. Diverging from the mainstream perspective in this HSR Special Issue, 
Nuno Madureira describes the structural obstacles to anticipating an event such 
as the oil crisis. In particular, he concurs with David Painter that the outbreak 
of the Yom Kippur War was not and, perhaps, could not be foreseen in the 
West. Thus, at least the exact timing of the oil crisis took everybody by sur-
prise. Moreover, the oil price increases presented a situation that stood in stark 
contrast to the price stability that had been experienced over the previous dec-
ades. As there were virtually no studies on the price elasticity of the oil de-
mand, it was consistently overestimated, and OPEC’s capacity to raise the price 
was thus underestimated. Anticipations that OPEC would not be able to raise 
the price very much without risking the cartel’s unity dampened the perceived 
need to restructure the energy sectors away from oil.19  
In the second half of the 1970s, oil prices stabilized and even went down. 
Therefore, in 1977/78 many contemporary politicians believed they had man-
aged to cope with the crisis. Changes in the energy sector that accelerated after 
the first crisis, such as energy savings or the development of renewable forms 
of energy, were no longer seen as urgent. Oil consumption increased again, and 
the construction of nuclear power plants seemed to be an easy way out of the 
energy crisis. In 1979 it became clear that this was an illusion. Protests against 
nuclear power gained strength after the accident at the Three Mile Island power 
plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The accident quickened the halt of con-
structing new power plants in the United States and fuelled the growing distrust 
of nuclear power, which intensified again after the Chernobyl accident seven 
years later. At the same time, the second oil crisis in 1979 suggested that the 
sudden rise in energy costs due to the political conflicts in the Middle East six 
years before had not been just an accident, but would remain a constant danger 
into the future.20 Not without justification, many analyses argued that the eco-
nomic consequences of the second oil crisis would be much worse than those 
of the earlier one. In 1982, economic growth was at its lowest since WWII. 
Even in countries with a strong economy, such as West Germany, the recession 
was worse than the one that followed the 1973 crisis.21 While many consumers 
thought energy problems belonged to the past, the second oil crisis suggested 
that a sufficient, low-cost energy supply would be an enduring challenge and 
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energy conservation would still be necessary. 22 Discussions of measures that 
had been brought up in 1973/74 now intensified. Economic developments and 
political measures led to a decrease in oil consumption in the major industrial-
ized countries in the 1980s, and other sources of energy gained importance, 
even though oil continued to be the most important primary fuel.23 Moreover, 
the political consequences of the second oil crisis were substantial. In its wake, 
many governmental administrations were flushed away, and the economic 
policies of the new governments, such as that of Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl, 
were also designed to overcome the crisis’ consequences, targeting inflation, 
especially.24 As André Steiner’s article shows, socialist countries also experi-
enced significant consequences. In particular, high energy prices intensified the 
production of brown coal, leading to fundamental economic and environmental 
problems. The International Energy Agency, which had been established after 
the first oil crisis to prevent future energy crises, could do nothing in the face of 
increasing prices at the spot markets. Therefore, the second oil crisis also 
stands as a warning that the next crisis always differs from the preceding and 
can be neither fully anticipated nor prevented.  
3.  Energy Studies and the Self-Reflexivity of the 
“Anthropocene”  
In the 1970s, energy emerged as a coherent field of knowledge and policy. 
Since the late nineteenth century, there had been attempts to describe societies 
in terms of their energy use. From the interwar period to the 1970s, experts met 
regularly at World Power Conferences, but, by and large, experts and adminis-
trators dealt with specific types of energy separately.25 With the energy crises, 
however, the need for a unified perspective on national and global energy bal-
ances intensified. Newly founded journals, such as Energy Policy (1974), Re-
sources Policy (1974), and the Annual Review of Energy (1976), created a 
forum for interdisciplinary scholarly discourse on energy. Simultaneously, 
governments developed comprehensive energy programs and reorganized 
energy related competences, sometimes establishing departments of energy.26 
Using Paul Crutzen’s notion of the Anthropocene, or the current epoch, in 
which the human use of fossil fuels has severely impacted the earth’s ecosys-
tem, one might say that, in the 1970s, the Anthropocene became self-
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reflexive.27 Discussions on human energy use and “social metabolism,” as well 
as the more innovative environmental history that deals with the complex hu-
man-nature interactions, emerged from the decade’s debates on the needs to 
diversify energy supplies and limit the negative environmental impacts of ener-
gy consumption.28 
The oil crises established a new transnational knowledge of energy. Howev-
er, countries reacted to the crises differently, depending on their respective 
energy balances, their amount of domestic energy resources, cultural traditions, 
and political systems. This volume analyses the specific national reactions of 
the United States, Western Europe, and two major communist states, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union. While oil was the 
dominant fuel in the OECD countries in the early 1970s, in anticipation of and 
reaction to the first oil crisis, they attempted to diversify their energy supplies 
by importing smaller portions of oil from a greater number of countries and 
increasing shares of other forms of energy.29 This diversification strategy, 
which contemporaries dubbed “coconuke” for “coal, conservation, nuclear 
energy,” has been scrutinized extensively by previous political science litera-
ture.30 The papers in this volume do not examine the short-lived attempts to 
revive coal, nor do they focus on energy conservation. They approach the ener-
gy issue from the perspective of production, rather than consumption.31  
Nevertheless, nuclear energy, which contemporaries believed to be the most 
important form of energy for the future, plays an important role in Christian 
Marx’s article. Concentrating on failed nuclear power station projects, Marx 
demonstrates the difficulties that the expansion of nuclear energy faced in 
many countries. Mogens Rüdiger stresses the development of wind energy in 
Denmark. Moreover, Robert D. Lifset, Frank Bösch, Jeronim Pérovic, and Dunja 
Krempin concentrate on natural gas, which is often overlooked, but was essential 
not only in the attempts to overcome the energy crises but also to intensify East-
West trade. It was also seen as a cleaner alternative to oil. By integrating these 
other sources of energy into the discussion, as well as examining the broader 
reconfiguration of knowledge systems and energy policies, it becomes obvious 
that we have to speak of the energy – rather than the oil – crises. 
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4.  Transnational Energy Flows, the Cold War, and the 
Nation State  
The energy crises were both transnational and truly global phenomena. As 
André Steiner points out, despite its reliance on oil from the Soviet Union, the 
German Democratic Republic was deeply affected by the oil crises, although 
differently than its Western counterpart. Like Pérovic and Krempin, he argues 
that the Soviet oil price increases had a negative effect on the GDR’s economy 
and strained relations in the Eastern bloc. This was not unlike the straining of 
the transatlantic alliance over the energy issue in the 1970s.32 In an era of dé-
tente, Western European governments, especially, attached more significance 
to energy security than to upholding the East-West divide, as Elisbetta Bini 
shows for the case of Italy and Frank Bösch for Germany. In fact, many con-
temporaries prematurely maintained that the Cold War was about to be substi-
tuted by an age of resource conflicts between an industrialized, but resource-
poor North and a resource-rich South.33 However, the challenge to the Cold 
War order remained short-lived and, by the early 1980s, bloc confrontation 
intensified again. David Painter’s main contention is that the Cold War cannot 
be properly understood without taking oil into consideration. He scrutinizes the 
importance of oil in the formation of the Cold War order from Nixon to Carter, 
the latter of which established the doctrine that any attempt to change the bal-
ance of power in the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on the United 
States’ vital interests.34 However, it is striking that cooperation in energy mat-
ters remained a bridge between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, even 
during harsh conflicts, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
NATO Double-Track Decision in 1979. 
In a broadened view of the international order of the 1970s, the energy cri-
ses show both increasing attempts to cooperate internationally and the persis-
tence of energy security as a concern in national politics. In his analysis, Hen-
ning Türk deals with the International Energy Agency, the most salient new 
international organization, which sprang from not only the attempts of Western 
industrialized nations to overcome the energy crisis but also Henry A. Kissin-
ger’s desire to bring European allies in line and secure US hegemony.35 Simi-
larly, Elisabetta Bini describes the Italian initiatives to create a multilateral 
dialogue that included the producing countries which did not prevent the Italian 
government from competing with other European countries for bilateral deals 
to secure its oil supply. Despite the explicit avowals of multilateral cooperation 
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and the importance of multinational oil companies, particularly in sharing the 
burden of the embargo and production cuts, the transnational oil crisis created, 
above all, a moment in which governments tried to achieve energy security for 
their own countries, even at the expense of others. Tellingly, the countries of 
the European Communities did not achieve meaningful cooperation in the field 
of energy and could not even maintain a common position at the Washington 
Energy Conference in February 1974.36 
While this HSR Special Issue bridges the East-West divide and includes 
Eastern European perspectives that are often left out of the history of oil, it 
does not include articles on the producing countries in the so-called Third 
World. As Nuno Madureira argues and other papers show, the industrialized 
world had limited knowledge of the producing countries in the 1970s. For 
many Western observers, OPEC appeared to be a black box. That is, the out-
come of its decisions could be seen only when they were announced; they 
could be neither anticipated nor influenced. As the German ambassador to the 
international organizations in Vienna explained in 1973,  
This, in comparison to other international organizations’ very restrictive in-
formation policy, demonstrates the difficulties of the diplomatic missions in 
Vienna to acquire ‘inside information’ from OPEC […] This ‘wall’ can be 
overcome only by personal and social contacts, targeting the more open mem-
bers of the OPEC secretariat, which requires a lot of time and perseverance.37 
While it may be regrettable that many of the papers in this HSR Special Issue 
are in a similar position with respect to OPEC’s internal decision-making pro-
cesses, their focus on the anticipation of and reactions to the energy crises in 
the First and the Second Worlds makes this excusable. 
Altogether, this HSR Special Issue shows how fruitful it can be to integrate 
energy history into more standard narratives of contemporary history. In some 
way, every meaningful historical action and event depends on energy flows. 
That everything is connected to energy, however, does not imply that energy is 
always the best angle from which to analyze certain actions and events. Despite 
their focus on energy, the papers, thus, avoid the temptation to turn energy into 
the central element that explains everything that happened in the 1970s. They 
do not use catchy terms like “high-energy societies” or “hydrocarbon men,” 
which have little explanatory value and often obfuscate more than illuminate 
the processes under scrutiny. Instead, the papers integrate energy into a history 
of politics, economics, and international relations. Moreover, they analyze the 
dominance of fossil fuels in the energy regime of the nineteenth and twentieth 
                                                             
36  Möckli 2009, 252-79; Tauer 2012; Gfeller 2012 and the contributions by Henning Türk and 
Rüdiger Graf in this HSR Special Issue.  
37  Ungerer, [Werner]. Schreiben zur Informationspolitik der OPEC. March 6, 1973, Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin, Bestand 71 (Referat 405), 113907. 
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centuries, the consequences of which are discussed intensely in the present-day 
search for a more sustainable energy regime.  
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